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Biologic Terrorism — Responding
to the Threat
The growing awareness of the possibility that
a terrorist organization might use a biologic agent
in an attack on a civilian target in the United
States raises important questions about our capa-
bility as a nation to respond effectively to the
threat and to deal with the consequences of an
attack. The article by Kaufmann et al. in this
issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases describes
three possible biologic attack scenarios and uses
an economic analysis to describe the benefits of a
rapid medical response and early intervention.  The
authors conclude that major reductions in mor-
bidity and mortality and consequent cost savings
can be achieved by early intervention.  The effec-
tiveness of postattack intervention depends on a
rapid response which requires prior planning,
preparation, and training.  Achieving the level of
preparedness implied by the assumptions stated
in the article will require a major national effort.
This discussion of possible bioterrorist attack
scenarios adds to a growing concern about our
willingness as a nation to commit the effort and
resources necessary to protect our citizens.
Biologic warfare and use of biologic weapons
by terrorists have only recently been discussed
openly and realistically. The fall of the Soviet
Union and the defeat of Iraq uncovered extensive
biologic weapons programs of surprising sophisti-
cation and diversity. The threat to the nation from
biologic weapons is no longer a debate issue. Now
the questions are how immediate and serious is
the threat and how do we respond effectively?
Protecting the armed forces against biologic
weapons, although complex and difficult, is less
challenging than protecting the civilian popula-
tion. The armed forces are relatively small popu-
lations that can be vaccinated against the major
threat agents. Aerosols containing biologic materials
can be detected at a distance, and protective
masks and suits are effective. Military medical
personnel are trained to recognize and treat
casualties, and antibiotics, antiviral drugs, and
antitoxins can be stockpiled for military contin-
gencies. The preponderance of scientific expertise
for many of the threat agents is within the
military medical research laboratories, although
this capability is now being seriously compromised
by budget cuts and personnel reductions.
The civilian population cannot be protected
in the same manner as the armed forces. We must
rely heavily on our intelligence and criminal
investigation agencies and on international efforts
to identify specific threats and deter terrorists.
We must also recognize the possibility that a
determined terrorist organization may not be
deterred, may evade detection, and may succeed
in releasing an aerosol of a virulent bacterium,
virus, or toxin in a susceptible target area such as
an airport or stadium. Our current capability to
effectively respond to such a scenario and
minimize the impact is far less than needed.
The U.S. Armed Forces and the Department
of Defense have the greatest capability in biologic
defense, but the responsibility for dealing with
the threat of biologic weapon use by a terrorist
falls on multiple federal, state, and municipal
agencies and the civilian health care community.
Most of the organizations are inadequately pre-
pared to deal effectively with the problem.
The organizational aspects of dealing with an
attack on our civilian population are daunting.
Responsibility for recognizing an unusual out-
break of illness that may be the result of the
deliberate release of a biologic warfare agent will
fall on the health care community. Early recog-
nition will be an important factor in determining
the overall outcome and will depend on the level
of suspicion and knowledge of the health care
providers that see the initial cases. Rapid, precise,
and reliable diagnosis will be the responsibility of
the federal and state public health laboratory
system with help from their military colleagues.
Organizing and managing the care of patients and
mounting the appropriate public health response
will involve local health care and municipal agen-
cies and authorities and state public health
authorities. The effectiveness of coordination, sup-
port, and leadership at the federal level may make
huge differences in reducing death rates and con-
taining the possible secondary spread of a communi-
cable disease. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency has the major responsibility for planning
and coordinating the consequences phase of a
federal response, but the level of preparedness at
all levels will ultimately determine the outcome.
If we take the biologic warfare threat seriously,
a major effort will be needed to develop contin-
gency plans and initiate coordinated and mutually
supportive programs in all involved agencies.
Training and education of the health care com-
munity will require a major effort involving
several major professional organizations.
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fication capability is essential for medical care,
public health, intelligence, and law enforcement
agencies and should be a national priority.
The science base needed to deal with the
broad spectrum of agents on the threat list, bac-
teria, viruses, toxins, and parasites, is widely
distributed among several federal laboratories in
the Department of Health and Human Services,
the Department of Defense, and the Department
of Energy, as well as in universities and state
public health laboratories. In addition, since many
of the biologic agents are not normally large
public health problems or popular subjects of
scientific research, critical areas have inadequate
research capability and limited expert personnel.
Deficiencies in our scientific knowledge and a
paucity of experts will ultimately limit our
capability to rapidly and precisely identify agents
and respond effectively in a crisis. For example,
the global molecular epidemiology of the agents
at the top of the threat list is critically important
for identifying the organisms accurately and dif-
ferentiating local from exotic strains. Current
databases are inadequate, and no organized effort
is being made to fill in the gaps.
The current public discussion of the threat of
biologic terrorism is an opportunity to evaluate
our collective capabilities and to assess weak-
nesses and vulnerabilities. Raising the level of
national preparedness will require leadership and
action by responsible federal agencies. A thoughtful
analysis of the consequences of unpreparedness
provides a mandate for action.
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